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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS),

*

Plaintiff/Appellee,
*

Case No. 960548-CA

*

Priority No. 15

vs.
BRUCE C. EDWARDS
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e) and/or (h) (Supp. 1995),
which provides that the court has appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from the district court involving criminal and domestic
relations cases.
This appeal is proper pursuant to U.C.A. §77-18a-l(a), as it
follows an order finding contempt pursuant to U.C.A. §78-32-1(5).
This order followed an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable
Rodney S. Page, Judge of the Second Judicial District Court of
Davis County, on the 23rd day of July, 1996.
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in failing to

disqualify itself for bias and prejudice.
Standard of Review:

The trial court's determinations of law

will be reviewed for "correctness."

This matter approximates a

"de novo" review as the appellate courts closely and regularly
determine the legal effect of specific facts. State v. Pena, 869
1

P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in summarily

finding contempt of court where the prospective contemptuous
behavior, indirect in nature, had not occurred.
Standard of Review:

The trial court's determinations of law

will be reviewed for "correctness" i.e., the appellate court owes
no deference to the lower court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932
(Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment XIV
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 63(b)
Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is
to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter.

2

Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for
the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed
as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or such
bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against whom the
affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit,
he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of the same
court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge
against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally sufficient,
another judge must be called in to try the case or determine the
matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to
file more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record
that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section §78-2a-3(2)(e)(i)
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (e) interlocutory
appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; (i)
appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and
paternity.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section §78-32-1(5)
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or
proceeding therein are contempts of the authority of the court:
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section §78-32-3
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily,
for which an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring
in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person
proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be
punished as prescribed in Section 78-32-10 thereof. When the
contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of
the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented
to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or
a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other
judicial officers.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the order, rendered by the Honorable
Rodney S. Page on the 23rd day of July, 1996, finding Mr. Bruce
Edwards, appellant, in contempt pursuant to §78-32-1(5)
U.C.A.(1953) for a prospective failure to comply with a court
decree.

The appellant also appeals the court's previous ruling

concerning the legal insufficiency of the appellant's affidavit
for disqualification filed prior to the above referenced hearing.
The parties herein, having one child, were divorced in November
of 1985, and since that time have had numerous court hearings.
Pursuant to the most recent Order to Show Cause brought by the
custodial parent Jana Edwards (Ross) the court ordered that Mr.
Edwards pay child support on or before the 10th of each month.
The court further ordered that for any and all months the
payments were not timely, the defendant would be in contempt,
sentenced to 30 days jail and a bench warrant issued for his
arrest.

The court also granted judgment for attorney fees in the

sum of $250.00 for plaintiff's counsel and ordered that the fees
be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month with similar contempt
provisions.

The appellant now appeals this order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties, previously husband and wife, were divorced in
November of 1985, in the District Court of Davis County, State of
Utah.

Plaintiff was granted the custody of the parties minor

child, namely: Wesley Kenneth Edwards, presently 14 years of age.
Defendant, Bruce C. Edwards, was granted visitation with the
4

child and was ordered to pay child support in an amount set by
the court.

The amount of the child support was later raised to

the sum of $175.00 per month.

On November 6, 1995, at the

request of plaintiff, Jana D. Edwards (Ross), a hearing was held
wherein Ms. Edwards sought contempt sanctions against Mr. Edwards
for failure to pay five months of child support and certain
marital debts as set forth in the parties' divorce decree.

The

amount of the marital debt to be paid by Mr. Edwards was
undefined at the time of the divorce.

In December of 1995, the

marital debt was fixed and the defendant stipulated that he would
pay the recently determined amount.

The court ruled that Mr.

Edwards was in contempt of court for his failure to pay this
marital debt and sentenced him to 3 days in jail.
In May of 1996, plaintiff brought another Order to Show
Cause In re Contempt, along with her petition for modification of
the decree of divorce, claiming, among other things, that the
defendant had failed to pay child support for two months.
Plaintiff requested an adjudication of contempt, judgment for the
past due support, attorney fees and related relief.

In the

modification petition, plaintiff sought to increase the support
and to terminate the child visitation.
Just prior to her above referenced filing, plaintiff denied
defendant's summer visitation with his son. (Tr. 20)

As a result

defendant sought a restraining order to allow visitation.

The

proposed order was presented to Judge W. Brent West, in Weber
County.

Judge West signed the order, but then rescinded after
5

conferring by telephone with Judge Page (addendum IV).

During

the telephone conference Judge Page on his own motion suspended
Mr. Edwards' visitation until further court hearing. (Tr. 21)
In June of 1996, prior to the hearing on plaintiff's Order
to Show Cause, defendant filed with the court his affidavit
seeking the disqualification of District Judge Page (addendum
II), pursuant to Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P.

Plaintiff, appellee

herein, filed an affidavit in opposition.

Both affidavits were

reviewed by District Judge Jon Memmott, who subsequently denied
the disqualification in his written ruling of June 18, 1996
(addendum III).
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause and Petition for
Modification came on for hearing before Judge Page on the 3rd of
July, 1996.

The defendant was again found to be in contempt for

his failure to keep his child support current.

Specifically, the

court found that Mr. Edwards had missed two consecutive months of
child support payments; (Tr. 63) notwithstanding the fact that no
evidence of such was presented at the hearing. (Tr. 33)

However,

it was determined that Mr. Edwards was current at the time of the
hearing. (Tr. 4)

Based on the contempt finding, the court

entered a jail sentence of 30 days and stayed the sentence on the
condition of future performance.(Tr. 65)

Further, the court

ordered that the defendant pay his child support on the 5th of
each month through the clerk of the court and in the event the
payment is not made by the 10th of the month, then the defendant
would be adjudged in contempt, sentenced to 30 days jail and a
6
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The appellant's right to fair trial under the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when the
trial court displayed actual bias and prejudice toward the
defendant, but refused to disqualify himself.

The appellant's

constitutional right to due process under the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when the
trial court ordered that he be held in contempt in the event his
future child support obligations were not timely met.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS INCORRECT WHEN IT FAILED
TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF FOR BIAS AND PREJUDICE.

In Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948), the court
held that actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge
disqualifies him.

The court went on to define the key terms,

bias and prejudice "mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will
toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism
towards one." Id. at 520.

In the case at hand the defendant

timely filed an affidavit with the trial court pursuant to Rule
63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (addendum 2)
The court of appeals found in Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d
8
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judgment rather than a citation of contempt.

However, prior to

advancing this argument the court took the unusual step of
ordering counsel not to make such an argument.

The court then

ruled that defendant was in contempt; notwithstanding the fact
that defendant was not allowed an opportunity to explain why the
debts remained unpaid.

Defendant was sentenced to 3 days in the

Davis County Jail.
As a general proposition, a judge should recuse himself when
his "impartiality" might reasonably be questioned.
Judicial Conduct 3(c)(1)(b) (1981).

Utah Code of

This standard set forth by

the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct should be given careful
consideration by the trial judge as it may require recusal in
instances where no actual bias is shown.
P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988).

State v. Neeley, 748

The court's various statements made

during the July hearing coupled with the prior ruling of contempt
allow for Judge Page's impartiality to be questioned.
In Lilieberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 108 S.
Ct. 2194 (1988), the United States Supreme Court concluded that
disqualifying facts which a federal district judge should have
known but which he had forgotten were sufficient to disqualify
the judge under the federal statute.

While the federal statute

in question in that case, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982), requires
disqualification for an appearance of bias, the court's
preference is clear.

In the interests of promoting confidence in

the judiciary a judge should recuse himself when faced with
legitimate, substantive reasons.
10
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Edwards'

The court also^

questioned the defendant's integrity when it found that the
defendant had not filed recent income tax returns.
In Boyinaton, 200 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948), the court found that
with "the haste, the procedural irregularities, and the lack of
consideration shown the defendant . . . , it is apparent that the
judge became hostile to the defendant and biased and prejudiced
to the extent" Id. at 727-728 that disqualification would have
been necessary.

The court found that the trial court's "actions

and words adequately displayed bias and prejudice, and as a
result, a person in defendant's predicament could never be
convinced that he was fairly tried, convicted and sentenced." Id.
b. The judge who reviewed defendant's
affidavit for legal sufficiency did so
improperly.
The court in Young v. Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1996),
opined concerning Rule 63(b) of the Utah R. Civ. Pro., that "the
rule's operation will render a trial judge unable to defend
[himself] against false or inaccurate allegations." Id. at 1281
The court made this observation in acknowledging that the
affidavit for disqualification was to be presented to the
reviewing judge without opposition.

The judge who reviews the

affidavit does so for "legal sufficiency" only.
weigh evidence.

He does not

The court further stated the an "affidavit may

be false but not so demonstrably so and therefore legally
'sufficient' for purposes of rule." Id. at 1280.

In the case at

hand Judge Jon M. Memmot goes beyond a review of "legal
sufficiency" and determines that Mr. Edwards' affidavit is not
12
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added, " [e]very month you fail to make the payment on time
be a seperate

contempt."

(Tr. 65 emphasis added)

will

Further, the

court added that " . . . you have one 30 day commitment right now.
If there are any future, any of those contempts will be added
onto that 30 day period." (Tr. 65)
clear.

The court's position is

Ms. Edwards by merely notifying the court ex-parte of an

untimely payment will trigger a 30 day jail sentence.

The

imposition of the sentence will not follow an inquiry into the
circumstance of Mr. Edwards' noncompliance with the order.
A finding of out of court contempt requires specific
procedural protections, namely a hearing.

Under section 78-32-3,

an affidavit must be presented to the court reciting the facts
constituting the alleged contemptuous conduct.

Case law

recognizes that, as a function of due process, one charged with
indirect contempt must "be advised of the nature of the action
against him, have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the
right to confront witnesses, and have the right to offer
testimony on his behalf."

Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, at

1322 (Utah 1982).
The necessity of an affidavit ensures "that the court and
the person charged are informed of the conduct alleged to be
contemptuous."

Von Hake, 759 P.2d 1162, at 1170.

"An affidavit

satisfies section 78-32-3 and due process if it sets forth the
acts done or omitted that form the factual basis for the contempt
charge."

State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, at 384 (Utah App. 1992).

This Court has ruled that where no such affidavit is presented to
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ADDEftDU

on this occasion.

Shortly aitci he received notice

of this petition, he brought one of those de'.Linquent
months <current , and then yesterday afternoon he
delivered June support to my office and I have given
that to my client this afternoon.
So at least as of right now, Mr. Edwards is
current in his support through the month of June, but
it's th<a same old story.

We're out of court two

months and he starts to become more tardy and fall
behind and he just doesn't get it, or if he does get
it, he manipulates it.
This Court has previously entered a judgment
for attorney fees.

It is our view that Mr. Edwards,

being in the business that he is, is basically
judgment proof.

He knows how to work the system,

he's involved with judgments and collection of
judgments and has previously boasted to my client
that she wouldn't ever be able to collect a simple,
ordinary judgment.
In point of fact, every time she has to hire
me to take some action, she agrees to pay me a
reasonable attorney fee, and in a sense then it comes
out of the support she is otherwise receiving and,
thereby, Mr. Edwards, in effect, is escaping an
obligation of child support.

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801) 399-8510

1

A.

She did call me once.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

order from the Court to give you the child for your

4

summer visitation?

5

A.I

6

Q.

7

and affidavit.

8

A.

That's correct.

9

Q.

Apparently, you met with Judge West, if I recall,

You sought, in fact, to obtain an ex parte

did.

And that was a pro se order that you had prepared

10

personally?

11

A.

That's correct.

12

Q.

And then he contacted this Court?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q.

And then —

15

whited it out after talking with this Court.

16

Court apparently indicated -- as you understand -- to

17

Judge West that visitation would be put on hold until

18

today.

19

A.

That's correct

20

Q.

There would be no visitation.

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

seen your son once or twice since that date?

24

A.I

25

Q.

have.

in fact, he'd signed it and then

Notwithstanding

This

that, apparently you have

Twice.

And what were the circumstances of you seeing

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801) 399-8510

1

Wesley on those occasions, Bruce?

Did you go to the

2

house and get him?

3

A . I

4

Q.

Why not?

5

A.

Because you suggested that I do not do so.

6

Q.

Well, I told you what Judge West told me

7

telephonically.

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

All right.

did not.

So to avoid being in contempt of any

10

court, you declined to seek the custody -- or the

11

visitation with the child?

12

A . I

13

Q.

14

then that you had these visits?

15

A.

16

the day before Father's Day and then one other time.

17

Q.

So you've seen him those two times?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

this.

21

you not?

22

A . I

23

Q.

24

Wesley?

25

A . I

did.

All right.

How did you -- how did it come to you

My ex-wife delivered my son to my parent's house

Mr. Edwards, let me move quickly through

You have some feelings towards your son, do

do.

Do you have a desire to have visitation with

do.

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801)
399-8510

1

Q.

And then the support for April and May was

2

delivered at one time by Wesley, those two payments

3

being made on June 16th.

4

A . I

5

any of those checks.

6

Q.

7

the dates that I have just mentioned?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Mr. Knowlton has just handed me checks —

Do you dispute that?

don't recall the dates that Wesley delivered

Do you dispute that you gave him the support on

copies

10

of checks purportedly being your child support

11

checks, and there are two that are dated June 6th and

12

June 10th for $175 each.

13

would be checks payable for your support for April

14

and May?

15

A.

(No response.)

16

Q.

You delivered June support yesterday to me,

17

correct, Mr. Edwards?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

And so the two checks dated June 10th and June

20

6th

21

A.

22

to you yesterday.

23

Do you deny that those

—
The check dated June 10th was the one I delivered

(Off-the-record discussion between Mr.

24

Florence and Ms. Ross.)

25

Q.

(By Mr. Florence)

Well, while she's looking for

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801)
399-8510
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1

MR. EDWARDS:

2

my budget and see exactly what my cash flow is.

3

MR. KNOWLTON:

4

THE COURT:

5

I'd have to go through

That's all, Judge.

You may step —

well, I

have a couple of questions myself.

6

Mr. Edwards, what did your income tax return

7

show for the year 1995 as to gross receipts from your

8

business?

9
10

MR. EDWARDS:

filing several back year's worth of taxes.

11
12

THE COURT:

MR. EDWARDS:

THE COURT:

15

MR. EDWARDS:

17

THE COURT:

MR. EDWARDS:

20

THE COURT:

MR. EDWARDS:

23

THE COURT:

25

I don't recall.
Is this what you taught

What?
To handle his affairs in

this manner?

22

24

When was the last time?

your son, also, I assume?

19

21

It's been several

years.

15

18

When is the last time

you filed a tax return?

13
14

I'm in the process of

No, sir.
How much income did you

have last year?
MR. EDWARDS:

Approximately a little

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R,
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1

over 20,000.
THE COURT:

2

Well, if you made 2,000

3

a month up through November of 1995, that's what,

4

20,000, 22,000?

5

MR. EDWARDS:

6

THE COURT:

7

And you're telling me

you collected what, 2,000 in the last eight months?

8

MR. EDWARDS:

9

THE COURT:
MR. EDWARDS:

11

THE COURT:
a house?
MR. EDWARDS:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. EDWARDS:

THE COURT:

MR. EDWARDS:

THE COURT:

22

MR. EDWARDS:

23

THE COURT:

25

I rent from my

Has that name (sic) ever

The house ever been in

my name?

21

24

Whose name is it in?

been in your name?

19
20

It's a house.

parents.

17
18

4695 Birch Creek.
Is that an apartment or

13

16

Yes, sir.
Where do you reside?

10

12

Yes, sir.

Yes.
No, Your Honor.
Has it been in their

name alone?
MR. EDWARDS:

Yes.

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
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MR. EDWARDS:

No inheritance.

No, I

have not.
THE COURT:

Have you received any

loans from them?
MR. EDWARDS:

Yes, I have.

THE COURT:

How much and when?

MR. EDWARDS:
let's see.

Over the last —

well,

In February I borrowed $10,000 from them;

March -THE COURT:

So you had plenty of

money to pay support ">
MR. EDWARDS:

(Nods head up and

down.)
THE COURT:
MR. EDWARDS:

What else?
I have borrowed

approximately $200,000 over a period of eight to 10
years from them.
THE COURT:
MR. EDWARD:
THE COURT:

Basically supported you?
To a large extent, yes.
Have other siblings

besides yourself?
MR. EDWARDS:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.
Have they received

similar sums?
MR. EDWARDS:

No, they naven't.

.Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
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1
2

THE COURT:

All right.

Anything

further, Mr. Florence?

3

MR. FLORENCE:

4

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

The record should note

5

that I have again met with Wesley in chambers and

6

talked about the visitation situation and his

7

relationship with his father.

8

say that that relationship is not the best it's ever

9

been.

10

I think it's fair to

But I still sense, Mr. Edwards, in spite of

11

the rocky situation that you've been going through,

12

that he has a desire to be part of your life.

13

I'm concerned a little bit about the

14

statements that you made and your methods of

15

disciplining.

16

father, and having sat here for a number of years and

17

observed what goes on in families.

18

admit, I'm somewhat appalled at your parenting

19

techniques.

20

parenting class in your own right.

21

missed the concept that 90 percent of the things that

22

we teach our children are what they see us do, and

23

that's a pretty bad example, if I were to consider

24

that's the only thing that you've taught your son.

25

You make big statements about integrity and

I'm not without some experience as a

And I'll have to

I think you could well be served with a
Somehow you've

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801)
399-8510

those kinds of things and yet here's a man who has
filed no income tax for over six years, essentially
has lived off his parents for that period of time,
none of which would rate very high on my scale when
it comes to integrity.
You're a man of abilities.
education.

You're a man of

You're a man of intelligence, yet you

have sore records as far as using any of them.
My major concern, as I've said many times, is
Wesley.

And I'm not naive enough to think that

Wesley doesn't manipulate when and where he can.

He

is a child and children learn to do that early on.
In particular, they learn to do that in divorce
situations.

And the parent who doesn't recognize

that and allows himself to be drawn into that, does
no service to their child.
And I say this for your benefit, Mrs. Ross,
because he uses you just as much as he uses his
father.

And he will continue to do that so long as

you two allow it to occur.

That doesn't mean you

need to be cruel with him or mean with him.

But it

just means that you need to use some common sense as
to what's going on.
As to the question of support, Mr. Edwards,
you know what your obligation is.

I have tried to

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801) 399-8510

1

the problem.

2

court file, you'll find that I made a motion pro se

3

four years ago to have the Court appoint an -- some

4

mediator, an arbitrator besides our son.

5

She refuses —

if you'll go back in the

And when my son sits there and beats me up

6 I

over child support that's been paid, so I -- I take

7

my payments and I give them to my son so he doesn't

8

bother —

9

that.

10
11

you know, so he doesn't antagonize me about

The payments are timely relative to the month.
I did miss one month.

12
13

THE COURT:

W e l l , sounds to me like

you missed about two months in two successions.

14

MR. EDWARDS:

15

THE COURT:

16

was paid in June, was it not?

17

MR. EDWARDS:

If there's

—

I think April and May

W e l l , Feb —

one month

18

got missed and that was an error.

I mean, I didn't

19

know that it had not been paid.

20

brought -- if my ex-wife would have communicated with

21

me and said, you know, what about this month's

22

payment or —

So when it was

I would have got it to her.

23

THE COURT:

All right.

24

MR. EDWARDS:

25

slipped my mind, but I have paid each and every

It was a month that it

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801)
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Clerk by the 10th of each month, a bench warrant will
issue.
Mr. Edwards, you understand what that is?
MR. EDWARDS:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Court finds that you're

in Contempt of Court for failure to pay child support
on time and for failure to pay each month as
previously ordered by the Court.

The Court will

sentence you to 30 days in the Davis County Jail.

I

will stay the imposition of that sentence, contingent
upon your payment of the support as previously
ordered.

Every month you fail to make the payment on

time will be a separate contempt.
So you have one 30 day commitment right now.
If there are any future, any of those contempts will
be added onto that 30 day period.
The Court will find that you were in arrears
when this <affid[avit was filed and you should be
requi red to pay' a reasonable attorneyjrs fee.

I'll

order that you pay $250 to your ex-wife for the
benef it of her attorney.
The Court will order that that be adde d to the
prior judgment and that you be o rdered to pay $50 per
month towards that judgment, and that' s to be paid
along with your attorney's fees -- or excuse me, the

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801) 399-8510
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ADDENDUM I I

DAVID J. KNOWLTON UBN 1850
Attorney for Defendant
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621 4852
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS),
Plaintiff.
AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION
Vs.
Civil No. 840735759
BRUCE C. EDWARDS,
Hon. Rodney S. Page
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER
Bruce C. Edwards, first being duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1.

That affiant is the defendant in the above entitled divorce matter.

2.

That the parties received a decree of divorce in the above matter on or about

the 4th of November, 1995. Under the terms and conditions of the decree of divorce,
the plaintiff was awarded the custody of the minor child of the parties, Wesley Kenneth
Edwards, now 14 years of age. The decree granted to the defendant reasonable rights of
visitation with the minor child.
3.

That despite extraordinary efforts by the defendant to enforce and exercise

his visitation rights as granted under the decree of divorce, there has not been one year
in the last 10 years when the defendant was allowed to fully exercise all rights of
visitation as granted by the court.

The plaintiff as custodial parent, over the years,

has blocked and frustrated defendant's visitation

in all ways imaginable. As a result,

the parties have appeared back before the court again and again since the entry of the
divorce over 10 years ago.
4.

That in November of 1994, after years of litigation between the parties,

defendant filed and served a petition for the modification of the divorce decree
seeking to change the custody of the minor child to the defendant.

This action was

Affidavit of Disqualification
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taken owing to the fact that the minor child, then 12 years of age, had indicated to
the defendant his dissatisfaction with living with the plaintiff, his mother, and her
new husband and complained about the treatment that he had received from them.

This

petition for the change of custody later came on for hearing before Commissioner Allphin
and the commissioner was requested by the defendant to speak to the minor child. After
this discussion, the commissioner indicated that the child was satisfied with the living
and custody arrangement with his mother, and thereupon recommended that the defendant
not be granted custody.

The commissioner allowed, however, that a home study could be

conducted, but that the defendant would be required to pay the cost of such a study.
5.

That the defendant was willing to drop the request for a change of custody

following the hearing with Commissioner Allphin, however, after the hearing the child
indicated to the affiant that when he met in private with the commissioner that the
court never asked him to state a preference as to custody and that he was never allowed
to give any opinion as to which parent should have his custody.

The child further

stated to the affiant that he continued in his preference and desire to live and
reside with the defendant.

At this time, it became clear to the defendant that the

minor child could be telling the defendant one thing and the court another.

In order to

give the child the benefit of the doubt, the defendant had a home study performed by
Joseph E. Prantil. During the home study, it became evident that the child was
reasonably pleased to remain in the custody of the plaintiff and was mostly satisfied
with that arrangement. Mr. Prantil thereupon recommended that the minor child remain
in the custody of the plaintiff. More importantly, the home study pointed up to the
defendant the real liklihood that what the child had been telling him was not his real
preference and desire, but simply what he, the child, believed the defendant wanted to
hear.

Upon receipt of the home study and in reviewing the same with his counsel, it

was apparent that given the real desire of the child to remain with his mother, that
defendant had little possibility to prevail in an attempt at the change of custody.
Had he not been misled by the child, he would not have pursued his petition for
modification, notwithstanding defendant's love for his child and defendant's long time
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desire to have the custody of his child.
6.

Thereupon, affiant instructed his counsel to communicate with plaintiff's

counsel, Mr. Florence, that defendant would not thereafter pursue the change of
custody.

Defendant's counsel, Mr. Knowlton then telephoned the office of Mr. Florence

and advised his secretary that defendant would not move forward his custody trial in
the District Court.
7.

That in spite of plaintiff's knowledge that defendant would not be pursuing

his request for a change of custody, Mr. Florence still wished further hearing in the
District Court on such issues of back support, contempt, and attorney fees.

Hearing

was then scheduled with Judge Rodney S. Page for the 6th of November, 1995.
8.

That the parties and their counsel appeared before Judge Page on November 6,

1995, whereupon Mr. Florence requested contempt sanctions be imposed upon the affiant
for failure to pay some five months of child support and also for the defendant's
failure to pay certain marital debts as set forth in the parties' decree and subsequent
orders in the approximate sum of $1,000.00.
9.

That at the time of the hearing, it appeared that the defendant had paid all

back child support in full prior to the hearing.

However, Mr. Florence sought contempt

for failure to have paid some $1,000.00 of marital debts. Defendant, through his counsel,
sought to argue that the obligation to pay marital debts was part of the property
division of the parties and not an obligation of child support or alimony.

Not being

an order to pay support, plaintiff's remedy would be for a judgment against the
defendant, rather than a citation of contempt.

Before defendant's position on the

matter could be advanced to the court, Judge Page took the unusual step of ordering
defendant's counsel not to make such an argument, stating in effect "Mr. Knowlton,

I
you are not going to make that argument." During this time, it became obvious to the
defendant that the court had determined to punish the defendant notwithstanding the
legal merits of the defendant's position. Accordingly, after defendant's counsel was
ordered not to argue the merits of defendant's position, Judge Page

ruled that the

defendant was in contempt of court for his failure to have paid the marital debts
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and ordered the defendant incarcerated forthwith for 3 days in the Davis County Jail.
Further, the court ordered that the defendant pay the $1,000.00 of marital debts
within 10 days or face further sanctions.

This order was entered without even an

inquiry of defendant's financial ability to make such a payment.

Indeed, defendant

did not have the ability to make this payment .within the time alloted by the court,
but on advise of his counsel, borrowed this sum from his parents and paid it to Mr.
Florence.
10.

That owing to the nature of affiant's business and this instant litigation,

affiant has been in court hearings on many many occasions.

In every such instance,

it has been the experience of the affiant that both parties, individually or through
their counsel, are given the opportunity to assert and argue their legal positions to
the court before a decision is made by the court.

Never before has the affiant

observed the court specifically order an attorney not to advance a client's cause
prior to the court's decision. When affiant's counsel was so ordered not to argue
defendant's position (that failure to pay marital debts was not punishable by contempt)
it became apparent to the defendant that the court determined to incarcerate him
notwithstanding the facts of the case or the requirements of the law.

Defendant then

served three days in the Davis County Jail.
11.
1996.

That a further hearing was held before Judge Page on the 24th of January,

Defendant does not recall being served with any order to show cause or affidavit

seeking relief or claiming any default by the defendant.

This hearing was scheduled

at the request of Mr. Florence apparently by conference call to Judge Page while
defendant's counsel was in the office of Mr. Florence. At the time of the hearing
Mr. Florence requested that the defendant again be punished by contempt.

It was

claimed that the defendant had violated an oral order of the court by requiring the
minor child to perform certain household work to work off the cost of the home study.
Also, as before, Mr. Florence requested attorney fees.
meet privately with the parties' child*

At this hearing the court

Following this interview, the court spent

some 20 to 30 minutes lecturing the defendant on how to raise a child. While not
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finding the defendant in contempt, the court was severely critical of the defendant's
parenting techniques.

Specifically, defendant explained to the court that he thought

it was important to teach the child principles of honesty and was concerned that the
child had not been honest and forthright with defendant in the custody proceeding.
12.

That at the hearing of January 24, L996, plaintiff counsel requested

attorney fees as before.

Presumably, Mr. Florence sought attorney fees not only on

the issue of the defendant's contempt, as granted earlier by the court, but also for
time and effort on the custody issue. However, at the hearing of January 24, 1996,
Mr. Florence never claimed that he had not received notice of the defendant's decision
to withdraw the custody request.

Indeed, Mr. Florence and his client

did not appear

at the January 24 hearing prepared to or intending to litigate the custody issue, but
rather to seek further contempt.

The very hearing was scheduled by conference call with

the court from Mr. Florence's office at a time when Mr. Knowlton was in attendance.
Mr. Florence had repeatedly been told that the custody would not be pursued.

Similarly,

at the hearing, Mr. Florence never claimed that he had no knowlege of defendant's
withdrawal of the custody request.

Defendant's counsel repeatedly explained to the

court that he told Mr. Florence and his office of the withdrawal of the custody issue,
and this was not controverted by Mr. Florence. Despite the stipulation of both counsel
on the 22nd of February, 1996, the court in its Ruling of Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorney's Fees stated:
The Court hereby concludes that the primary purpose of the hearing on
January 24, 1996, was in fact the custody issue; however, the parties
stipulated early on to the custody matter, and the majority of the hearing
concerned the question of payment of support and contempt. It did appear
to the Court, however, that Defendant had.filed to notify Plaintiff that
the issue was conceded even though that issue had been agreed between Defendant
and his attorney several weeks before.
From the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to the award
of reasonable attorney's fees applicable to Defendant's Petition to Modify
Custody which the Commissioner had recommended previously was without foundation.
As can been seen, the court specifically found that defendant's counsel failed
to notify plaintiff's counsel of defendant's withdrawal of the custody claim even
where both counsel stipulated to this fact in open court.
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That affiant finds it very strange and unusual that the court could

have found facts disputed by the stipulation of both parties (that plaintiff knew
of defendant's withdrawal of the custody claim) and proceed to award attorney fees
on the'basis of such facts.
14.

That apparently at the hearing of January 24th, while meeting privately

with the minor child, Judge Page told the parties1 child that he could call the judge
directly if further difficulties occurred between him and the defendant. Defendant
and his counsel were never informed of this fact or at least do not recall it being
made a part of the record.

It would, of course, be most unusual in affiant's

experience for a court to invite ex parte communications of a future nature from a
witness or a child the subject of litigation.
15.

That on or about the 3rd of June, 1996, the parties' child delivered a

letter to Judge Page and may have met personally with the court.

Neither defendant

or his counsel were aware in advance of this meeting or communication until contacted
by the court on a conference call with counsel on the 3rd of June, 1996. During this
conference, the court indicated that he had a letter from Wesley and wished to
schedule a hearing with the parties and their counsel.

This hearing was set for the

3rd of July, 1996. Prior to this conference call, defendant and his counsel had not
seen any letter, had not been aware of any meeting between the court and the child,
and had not been served with any motions, affidavits, or other pleadings. To the
knowledge of defendant and his counsel, nothing was pending before the court. However,
plaintiff and her counsel must have been aware of this cantact with the court as
Mr. Florence indicated that he had an order to show cause pending and was still
awaiting service on the defendant.

In the opinion of defendant and from the

experience of defendant, it would be most unusual for any court to in essence
interview a witness, much less a minor child, in advance of a matter yet to be
scheduled and heard by the court. Notwithstanding, the court indicated that he
wanted the matter scheduled directly with him and that the Domestic Relations
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Commissioner would be bypassed, contrary to the customary and usual proceedures of
the judicial system in these matters.
16.

That during the telephone conversation of June 3, affiant's counsel

requested of Mr. Florence copies of the pleadings that he was attempting to serve
on the defendant.

These were thereupon mailed to defendant and his counsel and

delivered to both at his counsel's office June 7th.

The documents, a Request for

Order to Show Cause in re Contempt and Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce
were signed by plaintiff's counsel May 20, 1996, well in advance of the child's
letter and/or visitation to the court. Affiant must therefore conclude that the
plaintiff and/or her counsel knew of and may have participated in the child's
communication to the court, all in advance of defendant being served and without
the knowledge of the defendant.
17.

That in the pleadings now filed with the court, plaintiff seeks to terminate

the defendant's child visitation.

This is essentially what the minor child has

requested in his letter to the court.

In addition, plaintiff again seeks to punish

the defendant for contempt for failure to pay two months of child support. As with the
November 1995 hearing, plaintiff again seeks to punish by contempt defendant's failure
to pay the attorney fees ordered by the court. As in November, with the marital debts
issue, it is the judgment and position of the defendant that an award of attorney fees
is not a support order for child support or alimony the failure of which may be
punished by contempt.

However, as with the November hearing, the defendant is fearful

that this court will not allow the defendant to be heard in opposition to plaintiff's
position and that he and his counsel will be silenced and that defendant will again
be jailed for failure and inability to pay a civil judgment not amounting to child
support or alimony.
18.

That on the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances; that the court

has ordered defendant's counsel not to argue his legal position with the court; that
the court has previously jailed the defendant; that the court has critically
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found fault in the parenting style and ability of the defendant; that the court has
invited future ex parte communications from the defendant's child; that the court has
bypassed the customary and usual proceedures of this court; and that the court has made
findings of fact in opposition of the stipulated facts of the parties in order to
penalize the defendant, it is the judgment of the defendant that the Honorable Rodney
S. Page has a bias or prejudice either against the defendant or in favor of the opposite
party, and by virtue of the same should proceed no further in this matter, except tp^call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Dated this

\ Q * day of June, 1996.

^^<<^ri

^ SS'—"

7*f

//

BRUCE C. EDWARDS^'
Defendant
-^
Sworn and subscribed to before me this /CJ

day of June, 1996.

/ £ £ % , JOAN M. PATTERSON
# ^ S § § $ \ HOTARYPUBUC'STATEcfUTAH

B* ffiSinSl 427-27th STREET
\& W ? #
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
'<Q£5>/
COMM. EXP. 6-30-99

TARY PUBLIC,
siding at Weber County*^.UT

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL OF RECORD
The undersigned counsel of record for the defendant in the above matter hereby
certifies, that in his opinion, the foregoing Affidavit of Disqualification is brought
in good faith by the defendant.
Dated this

\ Q > day of June, 1996.

Attorney^ for Defendant

JT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILID

Certify mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Brian R. Florence,
Attorney for Plaintiff, 818 26th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, this V ^ L day of June, 1996,
postage prepaid.

ADDENDUM III

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS),
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION

v.
BRUCE C. EDWARDS,
Defendant.

Case No. 840735759

This Court has reviewed defendant's affidavit of disqualification to remove Judge Page
on the basis of bias and prejudice. The Court has also reviewed plaintiff's response to
defendant's affidavit. In addition, the Court has reviewed the various pleadings and rulings
in the file.
Pursuant to Rule 63(b) URCP, this Court is to pass on the legal sufficiency of the
defendant's affidavit to determine if the motion should be granted or denied. Defendant, has
in his affidavit, discussed several areas in his motion to disqualify. The Court will review
each paragraph and issues raised.
In reviewing the record, the Court has reviewed previous cases interpreting Rule 63(b)
and believes the standard set forth in Christensen vs. Christensen. 18 Ut 2d 315 (1967) is still
applicable today. It states:
"Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias
or prejudice exists. This, we take it. means reasonable reasons. (Emphasis added) 18 Utah
2d at 318.
The Court has applied this standard in this review in determining whether there is a

1

reasonable basis for bias ami prejudice raised in defendant's affidavit for disqualification.
The Court finds the following as to defendant's allegations:
1.

Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are merely defendant's version of the history

of the case preceding Judge Page's rulings. As indicated in plaintiffs response, they
vigorously dispute many of the factual allegations as stated by the defendant in paragraphs 3,
4, 5 and 6.

e vie wing the f leadings and findings in

Court finds that many of

the statements set forth in paragraphs 1 through 6 are self-serving interpretations of the facts
arid1 iIn i mot rcpiescm Ilk' actual facts upon which rulings were made in this case.
2.

As to paragraph 7, the Court finds that the purpose of the hearing was not to

address the issue of custody, but rather was scheduled by plaintiff's counsel to address
defendant's failure to pay child support and to pay as ordw.1 <»n (he judgment entered
January 1994.
3.

As to paragraphs 8, 9 and ID, llic Court has reviewed the minute entry in the

file in addition to the findings of fact and order signed by Judge Page concerning the
November o, 1995 hearing. The Court finds that the minute entry specifically addressed
defendant's failure to pay the $100 per month for the judgment. Ihe Court finds this failure
to pay $100 as ordered was a proper basis for entering contempt against the defendant and
does not represent bias and prejudice.
4.
Knowlton to

As to paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, allegations that Judge Page did not allow Mr.
^ legal argument, the record is not clear. Plaintiffs counsel

has indicated that Judge Page allowed Mr. Knowlton to argue his theory, but following the
argument informed Mr. Knowlton that the argument was without merit. The burden is on the
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defendant in his affidavit to show specific instances of bias and prejudice. If, in fact, Judge
Page has inappropriately not allowed Mr. Knowlton to proceed with appropriate argument,
the defendant could have easily provided a transcript of the hearing as evidence. He has
failed to do so and mere accusations in the defendant's affidavit are not sufficient evidence in
which to establish grounds for bias and prejudice particularly where plaintiff's counsel
< i iiilf. in litis (lie ullegatmns in pILiinliff s affidavit. Therefore, the Court finds on the evidence
presented there was no bias or prejudice in Judge Page's conduct in relating to Mr. Knowlton
presenting legal arguments in the November hearing.
5.

As to paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, the Court has reviewed the record and finds

that notice of the hearing of January 24, 1996 was sent out on January 12, 1996 by Mr.
Brian Florence. That in reviewing Judge Page's ruling on plaintiff's motion for attorney fees
found that Judge Page ruled as follows:
"The Court hereby concludes that the primary purpose of the hearing on January 24,
1996, was in fact the custody issue; however, the parties stipulated early on to the custody
matter, and the majority of the hearing concerned the question of payment of support and
contempt. It did appear to the Court, however, that defendant had failed to notify plaintiff
that the custody issue was conceded even though that issue had been agreed between
defendant and his attorney several weeks before."
This Court reviewed the minute entry and findings of fact and conclusions of law and order
signed I , Jml^i1 Pap1

February 15 I *>% and approved as to form by defendant's attorney

David J. Knowlton. In that order Judge Page, the Court found that the defendant had failed
to pay the $1 n

_ that he was ordered to pay within ten days of the hearing held

November 6, 1995. With the assistance of his parents, it was paid to the plaintiff a few days
prior to this trial. Accordingly, the Court will not find the defendant in contempt. Further
Judge Page visited with the minor child to determine his concerns about his father's reaction
3

to the negative » 11st'nth rvaluation

Specific findings approved by Mr. Knowlton indicated

that Judge Page did not find the defendant in contempt of court for these actions, but
recommended that he be more understanding and prudent in his dealings with the minor child
on these issues. Judge Page would further consider the request of plaintiff for additional
attorney fees for having to defend the Petition for Modification brought by the defendant. As
indicated previously, this or iei was approved as to form b) defendant's attorney David J.
Knowlton and it appears that the defendant is raising issues in these paragraphs that have
been pi eviously order eel and agreed upon by his own legal counsel. It appears that the
defendant is dissatisfied with an order approved by his own counsel. If defendant or his
counsel felt the order was improper or in error their remedy was to challenge the order
through a proper motion rather than attack the ordei collateral!) through this affidavit.

Mr.

Knowlton approved the order; for purposes of this review the Court assumes he did approve
t]

refore, the Court finds no bias and prejudice in

Judge Page's actions listed in these paragraphs.
6.

As to paragraphs 14 and 15, the Court has reviewed the order by Judge Page

that the minor child contact him if there are additional difficulties between him and the
defendant. The Court has reviewed the letter sent by the minor child and the conduct by
Judge Page in setting further hearings. The Court finds that Judge Page h

ling

responsibility to see that the welfare and best interests of the minor child were being taken
care oil

This is partu nlarly so in this case based on the prior inappropriate conduct of the

defendant in relation to his son because of the custody evaluation. The Court finds based on
the record that the conduct of Judge Page was appropriate in protecting the child and would
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not con stitiite any inappropriate exparte communications. The Court doesn't find any bias and
prejudice by Judge Page against the defendant.
7.

As to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 , the Court has reviewed defendant's

allegations and finds that they represent suppositions about what the Court may or may not do
in regards to future hearings. There is no basis in fact for these allegations. The Court does
not find (lin viwsv siillicinil l.irlual basis Mial Jiid^c Page has bias and prejudice against the
defendant.
CONCI USION:
Based upon these findings the Court finds the affidavit of the defendant dated

IO,

1996 is legally insufficient and denies the defendant's motion to disqualify Judge Page
pursuant to 63(b) on the basis of bias and prejudice

In reviewing the totality of defendant's

affidavit, it appears to this Court that the defendant appears dissatisfied with the prior rulings
of Judge Page a

using this motion to disqualify him from the case because of his

dissatisfaction with prior rulings rather than on the basis of bias and prejudice. The Court
remands this case back to Judge Page for further disposition and hearing in this matter.
Dated June 18, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the /77V 7
postage prepaid, to the following:
Brian R. Florence
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

David J. Knowlton
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

Deputy Clerk
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ADDENDUM! 11

BRUCE EDWARDS
ProSe
P.O.Box 1886
Ogden, Utah 84402
(801)479-0666
I N THE DISTRICT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JANA D. EDWARDS
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING VISITATION
vs.
BRUCE C. EDWARDS

Civil No. 35759

Defendant,

Based on the motion of the defendant as supported by the affidavit of defendant,
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore,
now,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the defendant
shall be and is hereby granted visitation with the minor child of the parties to commence
forthwith and to continue to and through the 14 day of June, 1996, as per the amended
stipulated order of the parties, with the defendant to return the minor child to plaintiff on
the 15th day of June, 1996. Further, defendant shall be entitled to forthwith have the
minor child Wesley Edwards delivered to him for the purpose of carrying out the
visitation.

DATED this (e_ day of June, 1996

BYTpOTTTIv
DISTRICT JUDGE

